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Ruined in a Conventional Way:
Responses to Credit Ratings' Role in
Credit Crises
David J. Matthews *
"A 'sound' banker, alas!, is not one who foresees danger and avoids
it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional way
along with his fellows so that no one can really blame him."
-JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The Consequences to the Banks of the
Collapse of Money Values, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 168, 176
(1963).
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, abuses in the U.S. mortgage industry precipitated a financial
crisis that led regulators in the United States and in the European Union to
reexamine credit rating agencies. Asset-backed securities bearing agency
ratings helped spread the effects of the crisis to diverse institutional
investors, including European banks. This article traces debt securities and
ratings from the rise of the mortgage securitization industry to the European
and U.S. responses following the 2007 meltdown and concludes that
ratings-focused regulatory changes are only a first step in avoiding similar
financial crises. The market incentives, risk misperception, and risk
spreading that attend complex finance in the global market require further
improvements to capital adequacy requirements, credit rating practices, and
market participants' understanding of investor psychology.
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Northwestern University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the efforts and support of the Journal board and staff. The author thanks Dr.
Gary G. Matthews for asking, at an opportune moment, "what about investor psychology?"
For everything else, now and always, thanks go to Allison Matthews.
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II. SUBPRIME, RMBS, AND RATINGS
A. Subprime Mortgage Lending
During the past twenty years, the mortgage industry reached many
consumers whose credit profiles would previously have precluded access to
credit.' This extended reach came from specialty consumer finance firms
2
that target customers unable to secure prime loans.3 Prior to the 2007 credit
crises, much of the specialty market comprised "subprime" loans. The term
connotes lending to borrowers whose employment history, savings, credit
history, or other characteristics create a higher expectation in the lender of
loan default as compared to prime borrowers.4 A greater historical rate of
default means subprime loans are issued with higher average interest rates
and origination fees than prime loans.5  This added cost to the borrower
yields significant disparities: "[s]ubprime borrowers spend nearly thirty-
seven percent of their after-tax income on mortgage payments ... roughly
twenty percentage points more than prime borrowers spend.",6  Despite
these and other drawbacks, increased loan product diversity promoted home
ownership.7
U.S. federal legislation in the late twentieth century indirectly helped
create and nourish the subprime mortgage industry. 8  The Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the
Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982 helped diversify the
1 See David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating.Agencies Allow Predatory
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 985, 992-94
(2006).
2 Id. at 994.
3 Prime market originators lend to consumers who present "low risk" of defaulting on
loans, as judged using factors including sound employment history, savings, and credit
history. Id. at 993. Such originators "set interest rates below the market-clearing rate to
attract borrowers who present low risks of default." Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia C.
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L.
REv. 1255, 1278 (2002).
4 See Reiss, supra note 1, at 994. A year in the public lexicon has altered the term
"subprime" such that it is now synonymous with predatory, irresponsible lending practices.
See Rick Brooks & Constance Mitchell Ford, The United States of Subprime, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 11, 2007, at Al.
6 Subprime and Predatory Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market
Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinafter Subcomm.
Hearing] (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairwoman, FDIC).
7 "America's overall rate of homeownership has risen from sixty-four percent to sixty-
nine percent since the mid- 1 990s; among blacks it has gone from forty-two percent to forty-
eight percent." A Special Report on the World Economy: On Credit Watch, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 20, 2007, at 33 [hereinafter Credit Watch].
8 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 3, at 1275-76.
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mortgage market beyond fixed rate amortizing mortgages by permitting
lenders to offer adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) and interest-only
mortgages. 9  The Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and
Soundness Act of 1992 directed the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to significantly increase the volume of low-to-
moderate income home loans purchased by Government-Sponsored
Enterprises (GSEs).'I Any kind of loan that GSEs are willing to purchase
is necessarily one that lenders will strive to originate.II While GSEs face
restrictions on the loans they may purchase, enough subprime loans
conformed to those restrictions to convince the two home loan GSEs-
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association and Federal National Mortgage
Association-to begin purchasing subprime loans in 1997 and 1999,
respectively.12 The GSEs' guidelines for purchasable loans are influential
because many loan originators will strive to meet those guidelines with a
view to selling loans to the GSEs. 
13
During the late 1990s, the U.S. Department of Justice combated
predatory lending practices that were endemic to the subprime market.
14
The Department's prosecution of predatory lenders was largely effective in
steering the industry away from predatory lending practices, 15 but any such
success was tempered during the current decade by increasingly
irresponsible (if not predatory) practices 16 that harmed a wide swath of
consumers. 17 The harm was so widespread because of expansion in the
subprime lending market. 18 Non-prime loans composed sixteen percent of
9 Id. at 1275.
10 Id. at 1276. GSEs are "[p]rivately held corporations with public purposes created by
the U.S. Congress to reduce the cost of capital for certain borrowing sectors of the economy.
Members of these sectors include students, farmers and homeowners." Government-
Sponsored Enterprise (GSE), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gse.asp (last visited Nov.
23, 2007).
"See Engel & McCoy, supra note 3, at 1276; Reiss, supra note 1 at 1012.
12 See Reiss, supra note 1, at 1010-11.
13 Id. at 1012.
14 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Letter from the Dep't of Justice Regarding Predatory
Lending (Robert Raben, Assistant Att'y Gen. of the United States, June 5, 2000), available
at http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/predlend/doj.htm (listing many onerous loan terms
and practices investigated by the Department as well as relevant prosecutorial actions taken
between 1996 and 1999).
15 Predatory lending practices primarily involved marketing to consumers based on
minority ethnicity and/or old age, typically through geographic concentration. See U.S.
DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME LENDING, http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo
/lending/subprime.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
16 See infra Part III.
17 During this decade, subprime lending moved beyond its earlier concentration in low-
income urban communities and "rose sharply in middle-class and wealthier communities."
Brooks & Ford, supra note 5.
18 Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 6, at 6-7 (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairwoman,
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all U.S. loans in 2004 and twenty-nine percent in 2006.19 Among the most
popular products this decade have been hybrid-ARM loans that offer a low
interest rate for two or three years (during which time a borrower could be
expected to refinance or sell on the thriving housing market and pay the
lender a loan "pre-payment" fee) followed by twenty-seven or twenty-eight
years of much higher, periodically-adjusting interest rates.
20
B. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)
Securitization is a method of financing that is popular for its
advantages over traditional debt and equity financing.2' In traditional
financing, investors must monitor the issuing company because its
performance influences the value of the compan's issuances. The cost of
monitoring itself depresses issuances' values. Instead, an originating
company's receivables, which have value independent of com any
performance,24 can be transferred to a special purpose vehicle (SPV)2 or a
bank conduit created to acquire receivables. The SPV or conduit sells
securities representing interests in the proceeds of the receivables.27 In the
case of interest-bearing receivables such as mortgage payments, the
originator benefits from the spread between the securities' and receivables'
interest rates. 8  The securities are structured into tranches that signify
different levels of investment risk tailored to investors' appetites. 29 As the
FDIC) ("Intense lender competition, historically low interest rates, rapid home price
appreciation, and, crucially, investor demand for mortgage [paper] facilitated the dramatic
growth in the subprime market between 2003 and 2005."); concerning investor demand for
"mortgage paper," see infra Part II.B.
19 Brooks & Ford, supra note 5.
20 Id. "[A]pproximately 1.7 percent of U.S. households" secure hybrid-ARMs today.
Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 6, at 6 (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairwoman, FDIC).
21 BERNHARD BERGER, DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND ITS IMPACT ON ASSET




25 An SPV is a separate company created by the originating company for the purpose of
holding receivables and other assets and issuing securities backed by such assets. Engel &
McCoy, supra note 3, at 1274. Assets so held can be more highly valued by investors
because SPVs are separate from originating companies and are therefore not subject to an
originator's bankruptcy risk. See A. Brent Truitt & Bennett J. Murphy, Bankruptcy Issues in
Securitizations, in SECURITIZATIONS: LEGAL & REGULATORY ISSUES 2-1, 2-2 (Patrick D.
Dolan & C. VanLeer Davis III eds., 2000).
26 Timothy C. Leixner, Securitization of Financial Assets, in INTERNATIONAL ASSET
SECURITIZATION AND OTHER FINANCING TOOLS 1, 4 (Dennis Campbell & Susan Meek, eds.,
2000).
27 Engel & McCoy, supra note 3, at 1274.
28 Leixner, supra note 26, at 3-4.
29 See Credit Watch, supra note 7.
Ruined in a Conventional Way
29:245 (2009)
receivables payments come in, their cash flows first satisfy the obligations
issued from the least risky, most senior tranche and then satisfy each junior
tranche's obligations in succession. 30 The securities are structured with the
expectation that incoming payments will satisfy the obligations of every
tranche and, often, leave excess cash flows that accrue to the issuer.31
Market conditions in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged the
securitization of residential mortgages. A shortage of capital for mortgage
origination during the 1970s led the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Association to begin buying loans for securitization.32 The private sector
followed suit in the 1980s, and "by 1993, sixty percent of home-mortgage
loans were securitized. '' 33  Securitization financing has effectively
eliminated liquidity restraints on lenders, meaning specialty finance
companies need little capitalization to originate and sell loans. These
companies can take out warehouse lines of credit with large, established
banks and use the cash to originate and securitize loans, profiting from the
interest spreads between the warehouse lines and the mortgage-backed
securities. The transition from traditional "originate and hold" mortgage
lending-whereby banks and thrifts held their originations to maturity-to
the loan securitization model has had enormous impact on global financial
markets. Private debt securities issuances across the world are "far bigger
than stock markets.,
35
C. Ratings of RMBS
Each tranche of an RMBS issuance is rated by one or more of a
handful of financial analysis businesses commonly referred to as "credit
rating agencies" (CRA). In securitization, ratings are opinions as to the
issuance's "credit risk."3 6  Investment grade ratings are crucial to the
30 Hearing on The Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime Credit
Markets Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 5
(2007) [hereinafter CRA Hearing] (statement of Michael Kanef, Asset Backed Finance
Rating Group Managing Director, Moody's Investors Service) (hearing text unavailable;
individual statements and testimony collected at http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm
?FuseAction=Hearings.Home).
31 See Leixner, supra note 26, at 2. The issuer may also sell the right to receive any
residuals.
32 Engel & McCoy, supra note 3, at 1273.
33 Id. "[T]he RMBS market has increased by more than 500% from 1984 through the
early 2000s." Reiss, supra note 1, at 1008.
34 Engel & McCoy, supra note 3, at 1274. "Most subprime lenders are nonbank entities
that emerged as the result of securitization." Id. at 1279.
35 When it Goes Wrong... ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2007, http://www.economist.com
/finance/displaystory.cfm?storyid=9830765 (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter When
it Goes Wrong].
36 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 6 (statement of Michael Kanef, Asset Backed Finance
Rating Group Managing Director, Moody's Investors Service) ("Moody's estimates the
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marketing success of RMBS issuances, so originators structure issuances to
achieve those ratings by making changes required by eRAs.
37
CRAs require "credit enhancements," which are traits of RMBS
38issuances historically seen to reduce risks to investors. One significant
credit enhancement is the over-collateralization (O/C) tranche, which will
account for a historically-expected level of defaults (prior to the credit
crisis, typically five to ten percent) on the receivables by using a larger asset
pool than would be needed if zero defaults occurred.39 In the initial receipt
of proceeds from the receivables, the O/C tranche is filled before all other
tranches; it will only need "topping off' in later rounds of proceeds if
payment defaults or delinquencies cause some or all of the five to ten
percent buffer in that tranche to trickle down to subsequent tranches. The
investors' tranches do not begin to see losses unless the extent of defaults
overpowers the O/C tranche. That is why the historical default rate was
long thought to be a key evaluative factor in assigning ratings.40
With traditional corporate debt issuances, a sophisticated investor may
or may not rely on CRA ratings and may be able to assess the issuer's
creditworthiness independently.4' With respect to structured finance
issuances, however, the CRA rating takes on a gatekeeper role akin to
audits and analyses performed in connection with equity financings because
informational asymmetry hampers an investor's effective evaluation of
underlying mortgage pools. 42 The underlying pools present payment risks
unrelated to the issuer's or originator's creditworthiness, which means that
traditional ratings (which only evaluate an issuer's creditworthiness) are41
perhaps ill-suited to performing the gatekeeper role for RMBS. In
recognition of this, ratings of RMBS are indeed not traditional. Fitch
Ratings employs a volatility scale to represent its assessment of "the
potential impact of interest rate movements and other market risks on
individual tranches of issuances," 4 while Standard & Poor's affixes an "r
symbol to ratings of issuances that are subject to market risks. 45 None of
amount of cumulative losses that the underlying pool of mortgage loans is expected to incur
over the lifetime of the loans.").
37 BERGER, supra note 21, at 10-11.
38 Leixner, supra note 26, at 6-7.
39 Id.
40 See Reiss, supra note 1, at 1014.
41 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 2 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor,
Columbia Law School).
42 Id.
43 See Amy K. Rhodes, The Role of the SEC in the Regulation of the Rating Agencies:
Well-placed Reliance or Free-market Interference?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 293, 304
(1996).
44 Id. at 305.
45 id.
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this ensures that investors, even sophisticated ones, know or care about any
difference between ratings of creditworthiness and systemic market risk.
III. THE 2007 CREDIT CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS
A. Causes
Subprime lending was always characterized by higher loan risk
profiles than traditional mortgage lending, but recent years saw a
proliferation of loans that strain credulity. Loan products with low two or
three year introductory rates were well-suited to the housing boom, as
speculators and other borrowers could reasonably expect to sell or refinance
the mortgaged properties before rates reset at far higher, variable rates.46
Lenders often received pre-payment fee income from these sales and
refinancings.
The goal of securitization encouraged origination volume over quality,
since securitization structures could account for and buffer against
historically-expected levels of defaults. The drive for origination volume
pushed down required borrower credit score requirements, relaxed income
documentation requirements, pushed up loan-to-value ratios, and spurred
such innovations as loans with terms longer than thirty years and piggy-
back loans, wherein a second-lien loan covers a borrower's down
payment.47  Drastically reduced documentation requirements likely
produced fraudulent loan applications. Indeed, this type of loan came to be
known as the "liar loan.",48 Piggyback loans attached to approximately fifty
percent of subprime first-lien loans in some states in recent years.49
The recent housing downturn has meant that borrowers who qualified
only at introductory teaser rates could not likely sell or refinance before a
hybrid loan rate reset.50 In the case of real estate speculators--especially
those who had put no money down-the easy choice was to walk away
from properties once delinquency and default became real possibilities.
From the lenders' point of view, delinquency and default had apparently
stopped being something to fear and started being risk factors to account for
in securitization structures. Loan pools were sold without recourse into
SPVs and bank conduits, so many originators had neither the desire nor the
right to alter loan terms for struggling borrowers.
46 Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How did it Happen and How will
it End?, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Summer 2007, at 13, available at http://www.stroock.com
/SiteFiles/Pub533.pdf.
41 Id. at 14.
48 Id. at 15.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 14.
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Before the full extent of subprime problems was well-known, the
housing market downturn only served to increase competition among
mortgage lenders for a shrinking pool of borrowers in order to meet the as-
yet-unflagging investor demand for RMBS. 51 Those same investors were
convinced that securitization could effectively nullify risk by spreading it
across the RMBS market.52 Securitization did spread risk, but it also
diluted responsibility. Principal-agent problems were inevitable when one
middleman was replaced with several. On the one end, originators were
able to meet investor demand while quickly unloading risky loans off their
balance sheets; on the other end, investors ignored their inability to perform
monitoring because they could not resist the yields. 54  High ratings for
senior tranches allowed many RMBS issuances to carry relatively low
interest rates, which in turn allowed the underlying loans to be originated at
lower interest rates than would have been possible had lenders used only
traditional debt financing.5 These factors forced origination standards
down as the pool of qualified borrowers shrank 6
B. Effects
1. Early Signs
[Dielinquency and default rates were higher than anticipated.
[G]ains-on-sale accounting falsely inflated the industry's overall
profits. Investors noticed these trends: MBS prices dropped
sharply .... Without the connection to the capital markets through
securitization, subprime originators had fewer sources of liquidity.
Simultaneously, warehouse lenders, aware of the situation, called
many of their lines of credit from the subprime originators, further
limiting the liquidity available to originate subprime loans. [S]everal
large subprime lenders suffered from these trends. Some companies
went out of business while others were purchased by mainstream
lenders.
57
51 Krinsman, supra note 46, at 14.
52 Jason Dean & Peter Stein, The Man Who Saw it Coming, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2007,
at C2. "[T]he Wall Street firms and securitization ... created the desire for a very high-risk
product .. " Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 6, at 34 (statement of Steven L. Antonakes,
Commissioner of Banks, Massachusetts Division of Banks).
53 When it Goes Wrong, supra note 35.
54 id.
55 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 8 (statement of Senator Bunning).
56 When it Goes Wrong, supra note 35.
57 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. OFFICE OF POL'Y DEV. AND RES., SUBPRIME
MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, AND RISK-BASED PRICING (Kenneth Temkin et al., Mar. 2002
at 10-11), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/subprime.pdf.
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Though the above was written in 2002 to describe events in 1997 and
1998, the authors could have been recounting the events of 2007. The
difference is that immediately prior to the 2007 crisis, the subprime market
was far larger and more entrenched in the greater financial system, so the
current woes are felt more widely than during the 1997-98 down cycle. An
October 2005 edition of stock advisor Christopher Wood's investment
newsletter advised readers to "sell all exposure to the American mortgage
securities market., 58  Investors in Credit Suisse Group's December 12,
2000 $340.7 million collateralized debt obligation (CDO) (which is a
package of debt securities from different sources and, often, underlying
asset types) 59 would have appreciated that advice. Despite much of the
CDO having received triple-A ratings from the leading CRAs, increasing
defaults on the underlying securities caused losses totaling $125 million by
the end of 2006.60
In May 2006, U.S. subprime lender Ameriquest, since defunct,
effected massive layoffs and closed over two hundred retail locations. 61 By
March 13, 2007, "thirteen percent of subprime borrowers were delinquent
on their payments by sixty days or more. 62 In late 2006, Goldman Sachs
began pursuing an aggressive course of reducing its inventory of RMBS
and mortgage loans and hedging against losses in the mortgage market.63
Late 2006 and early 2007 saw a marked increase in (previously rare) early
payment defaults, reflecting the pronounced inadequacy of underwriting for
many loans originated in 2006-most early payment defaults occurred in
loan profiles that featured multiple risk characteristics (a characteristic
called "risk layering"), e.g., a piggy-back combined with reduced
documentation.6
Around 2005, CDOs came to replace other types of investors as the
major purchaser of the more subordinated, riskiest, highest-yield RMBS
58 Dean & Stein, supra note 52.
59 See Measuring the Measurers: Rating Agencies, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2007, at 77
[hereinafter Measuring the Measurers].
60 Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, CDOs Mask Subprime Loan Losses, INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 1, 2007, at 17.
61 Ameriquest Closes 229 Offices, Lays Off 3,800, E. BAY Bus. TIMES, May 3, 2006,
http://www.bizjoumals.com/eastbay/stories/2006/05/0 l/daily26.html.
62 Krinsman, supra note 46, at 14.
63 Jenny Anderson & Landon Thomas, Jr., Goldman Sachs Rakes in Profit in Credit
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at Al (indicating that the dump and hedge strategy of
Goldman Sachs has placed the firm in a position of relative strength compared to other Wall
Street firms).
64 Krinsman, supra note 46, at 5 (indicating that early payment defaults are a form of
loan sale recourse trigger and are defined between loan sellers and purchasers, typically as
"loans that become past due by two or more payments within the first three or four months
after origination.").
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debt tranches. 65 The repackaging undertaken by CDOs meant that a large
amount of BBB-rated RMBS debt purchased from diverse sources could be
restructured into new tranches including AAA senior tranches on the
assumption that historical default rates would leave at least the AAA
tranches safe. Without any fundamental change in the underlying assets,
the newly-AAA debt could now be purchased by institutions whose
investment options were limited by safety and soundness regulation. This
was mere alchemy. The precipitous rise in defaults did indeed reach many
AAA CDO tranches.
2. Market Effects: United States
In the United States, problems in the subprime market have had
deleterious effects on subprime borrowers and lenders, prime borrowers and
lenders, RMBS issuers and purchasers, and conduit and CDO creators and
investors.66 The rapid increase in early payment defaults triggered loan
repurchase obligations and gave large institutional lenders cause to pull
warehouse lines of credit to originators. 67 By mid-summer 2007, dozens of
subprime lenders were bankrupt, out of business, 68 acquired, or struggling
to obtain alternative financing.
Wall Street firms other than Goldman Sachs were hit hard: two Bear
Steams hedge funds had leveraged their investors' money to buy into CDOs
backed by subprime RMBS and the collapse of those funds nearly sank the
firm.69 Compared with third quarter 2006, third quarter 2007 profits were
down 73.8% at Bear Steams, 76.7% at JPMorgan Chase, and 83.45% at
Citigroup. 70 The major firms cut more than 24,000 jobs in 2007 through
November.71 Compounding the damage to banks that issued CDO debt
were credit enhancements called liquidity puts, which were essentially
refund guarantees used to increase credit ratings and attract more
investors.72 The crisis has so far yielded over $45 billion in large bank
65 See Mark H. Adelson & David P. Jacob, The Sub-prime Problem: Causes & Lessons,
(unnumbered working paper, Adelson & Jacob Consulting, LLC, Working Paper, Jan. 8,
2008), available at http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/Sub-prime-Problem-Causes_
&_Lessons.pdf.
66 Brooks & Ford, supra note 5, at A16 (stating "[S]ubprime loans burrowed into the
heart of the American financial system.").
67 Krinsman, supra note 46, at 16.
68 Id.
69 Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Bear Bets Wrong, Bus. WK., Oct. 22, 2007, at 52.
70 Duff McDonald, Big Swinging A: Merrill Lynch's Stan 0 'Neal Became the First Wall
Street CEO to Lose His Job Over the Credit Crisis, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Nov. 12, 2007, at 18.
71 Lisa Kassenaar, At Subprime Conference It's Too Early to Tell Who 'l Survive (Update
1), BLOOMBERG, Nov. 20, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive
&sid=acYywk3niL8.
72 David Henry, This Disaster was Guaranteed, Bus. WK., Dec. 10, 2007, at 26.
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writedowns.73 As of November 2007, Citigroup was projected to write
down an additional $15 billion from CDO losses. ' These losses, as well as
sizable losses reported by Merrill Lynch, come chiefly from AAA-rated
CDO debt.75
3. Market Effects: Europe
Since RMBS were packaged into CDOs sold across the globe, many
funds and banks abroad have significant exposure to U.S. subprime
mortgages.76 Of $1.5 trillion in outstanding CDO value worldwide,
between $500 billion and $600 billion is backed by some type of mortgage-
backed security. 77 At the start of the crisis, many abroad felt certain the
effects would be limited to the United States.7 8 All were disabused of that
notion when regional German bank IKB needed an 618.1 billion bailout
from a consortium of German state banks in early August 2007. 79
For the bulk of its eighty-three years, IKB generally limited its
business to Mittelstand financing.80  In 2002, the bank embraced a new
business model wherein it created a structured investment vehicle (SIV),
which is a kind of conduit designed to issue short-term paper to fund CDO
purchases; the bank set up a second SIV for the same purpose in June
2007.81 The short-term paper proceeds came from various sources,
including a Minneapolis school district and the city of Oakland,
California. 2 These and other investors stopped buying (or "rolling") the
short-term paper once they learned that their returns depended on CDOs
backed in part by RMBS. 83 With no new funding (and with no investors
73 Kassenaar, supra note 71.
74 Kosuke Goto & Stanley White, Yen Trades Near 1 1/2-Year High Versus Dollar on
Debt Losses, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 22, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=anX3.pPcZQy8 ("The dollar has lost 9.9 percent against the euro and 7.8
percent against the yen this year as two rate cuts by the Federal Reserve," made in response
to the subprime crisis, "dimmed the allure of U.S. assets.").
75 Peter Eavis, Cure for Pain, FORTUNE, Nov. 29, 2007, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2007/1 1/28/magazines/fortune/fortune500/eavis.creditfix.fortune
/index.htm.
76 See Jenny Anderson & Heather Timmons, Why a U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis Is
Felt Around the World, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 2007, at Cl, C5.
77 id.
78 Peter Gumbel, Subprime on the Rhine, CNN MONEY, Sept. 4, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com (search "subprime on the rhine" and then follow "Subprime on the
Rhine" hyperlink).
79 See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., How Subprime Mess Ensnared a German Bank, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at Al.
80 id.
81 Gumbel, supra note 78.
82 Mollenkamp, supra note 79.
83 id.
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willing to purchase the current CDO holdings), IKB's SIVs were soon
unable to meet their outstanding short-term paper obligations.84  This
situation is an unfortunate example of how crisis spreads. While subprime
defaults were certainly higher than expected, it was not RMBS or CDO
under-performance that sank IKB or its SIVs. Rather it was investors' rush
to disassociate from all subprime exposure. The same problem hit German
state bank Sachsen LB later in August 2007.85
Most Landesbanken were created in the nineteenth century to finance
local business s6  These institutions are smaller than their international
competitors and have had trouble with European Union integration, which
required German states to rescind guarantees that had previously reduced
the banks' costs of capital.87  After losing those guarantees, the SIV
strategy used by Sachsen LB and IKB was so common among the
Landesbanken that these banks held almost one quarter of the
approximately $510 billion that European banks had in conduits funding
long-term investment using short-term paper.88
With so much long-term investment funded with short-term paper,
investor skittishness stood to cause widespread harm. The August 2007
bank run suffered by the United Kingdom's North Rock Bank, which had
used conduit funding, illustrates the contagion's effect. 89  Aside from
conduit problems, the general dearth of liquidity has stifled European
banking. BNP Paribas suspended investment funds totaling E1.5 billion in
early August. 90 Deutsche Bank's inability to sell its loans on the secondar
market resulted in a third quarter 2007 pre-tax loss of E179 million.
Economic growth was forecasted to slow across Europe, 92 particularly in
the United Kingdom. 93  Following Swiss Reinsurance Company's $1.08
84 id.
85 Ivar Simensen & Ralph Atkins, Subprime Exposure Drags Down German Banks, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com (search "simensen subprime german




89 Credit Watch, supra note 7.
90 Will Andrews, Subprime: the Ugly American Hits Europe, Bus. WK., Aug. 9, 2007,
available at http://www.businessweek.com (search for "subprime ugly american" and follow
first result hyperlink).
91 John O'Donnell, Crisis Rocks Deutsche Bank but No Nasty Surprises, REUTERS, Oct.
31, 2007, http://www.reuters.com (search "o'donnell crisis rocks deutsche" follow first result
hyperlink).
92 EuR. COMM'N, AUTUMN ECON. FORECAST 2007-2009: GROWTH MODERATING,
IP/07/1666 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/07/1666 ("[g]rowth in the European Union economy is expected to decelerate
from 2.9% in 2007 to 2.4% in both 2008 and 2009.").
93 EUR. COMM'N, ECON. FORECAST AUTUMN 2007 111, available at http://ec.europa.eu
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billion loss owing to credit default swap payments tied to the crisis, the euro
"fell against 10 of the world's 16 most-actively traded currencies."
94
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL, POLITICAL, AND CRITICAL RESPONSES
TO RATINGS
Much of the criticism levied at CRAs stems from the seeming
obviousness of the underlying problems: because of widespread
irresponsible lending practices, historical default rates were insufficient
indicators for determining appropriate O/C levels in RMBS. In reality,
early payment default rates proved sufficient to drain all value from some
RMBS and destroy investor confidence in the rest. If the CRAs were
unable to spot this when initially rating the bonds issued off mortgage pools
and were so slow to downgrade the ratings, ask the detractors, how could
the CRAs possibly be trusted to provide accurate assessments?
A. In the United States
Does the fact that RMBS issuers pay for ratings create a conflict of
interest? Is any AAA rating of subprime RMBS or subprime-related CDOs
legitimate? Are CRAs too slow to downgrade previously-rated securities?
These are among the questions raised in the commentary and investigations
regarding the role of CRAs in the credit crisis.95
Once problems extended beyond borrowers and lenders and started to
harm large banks' conduits, 96 the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the President's Working Group on Financial Markets began new
investigations 97 and both houses of Congress conducted related hearings.
98
Members of the financial services industry, academia, and the press raised
the questions outlined above and suggested responses and solutions.
Much of the CRAs' profits come from structured finance ratings paid
for by a handful of investment banks that sell CDO issuances. 99 These
/economy-finance/publications/european.economy/forecasts-en.htm ("growth in the UK
economy is expected to slow to 2.2% in 2008."). Annual growth in the United Kingdom has
recently held at approximately 3%. Kerry Capell, Britain's Coming Credit Crisis, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content /07_38
/b4050069.htm.
94 Goto & White, supra note 74.
95 See CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 2 (statement of Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice
President, Standard & Poor's).
96 See Daniel Gross, Protecting Paulson's Pals, SLATE, Oct. 16, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2175724.
97 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 2 (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission).
98 See Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 6; CRA Hearing, supra note 30.
99 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 5 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor,
Columbia Law School).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:245 (2009)
issuers typically use multiple CRAs and can move business between them
without the SEC scrutiny, publicity, and adverse consequences that would
attend a change in outside auditor.100 These circumstances may lead to
conflicts of interest. 101 There are calls for business practice and disclosure
changes akin to those that reformed the accounting industry earlier this
decade.10 2  U.S. Senator Charles Schumer advocates a return to the
investor-funded ratings model, presumably to remove potential conflicts of
interest. 103
Critics point to both the tardiness and the market harms of the
summer's downgrades of previously-rated RMBS and CDOs as further
evidence of CRAs' blameworthiness. Moody's July 2007 downgrade of
billions worth of CDOs stoked the crisis. 104  Tardy downgrades may be
another by-product of the close relationship between issuer and rater.
CRAs earn no additional fees for monitoring and downgrading previously-
rated securities; in fact, doing so only stands to harm the issuer-rater
relationship. 10 5 The prospect of market punishment is real: since its July
2007 downgrades, Moody's has seen a precipitous drop in RMBS rating
market share from seventy-five to twenty-five percent, legitimizing CRAs'
fear of market penalties for downgrades. Because of this fear,
downgrades are typically tardy and are little more than "lightly premature
obituaries for terminally ill bonds." 107 One hedge fund manager wondered
"[i]f the rating agencies will downgrade only when we can all see the
losses, then why do we need the rating agencies?"'
10 8
Some question the validity of the initial investment-grade ratings for
subprime RMBS. In February 2007, market researcher Josh Rosner
predicted significant losses owing to the inapplicability of CRAs' historical
data-based evaluation models to pools of liar loans and piggyback
mortgages. 109 Professor White testified that investment grade ratings had
'00 Id. at 6.
1Ol Id.
102 Aaron Lucchetti & Kara Scannell, Moody's, S&P Answer Critics Over Bond Calls -
Rating Firms to Explain Their Mortgage Miss: Reforming the System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
2007, at CI.
103 See Credit Rating Agencies Defend Track Record, MSNBC, Sept. 26, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20992048; infra Part V.
104 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 5 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor,
Columbia Law School).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 6.
107 Id.
108 Bethany McLean, Ratings Agencies Under Fire, CNN MONEY, Aug. 21, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/20/magazines/fortune/ratings-agencies.fortune/index.htm.
109 Id.
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been overly optimistic. 1o
B. In the European Union
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas
Sarkozy have called for a regulatory reaction to CRAs' perceived failings...
and exerted pressure on European Union Internal Markets Commissioner
Charlie McCreevy and other officials to investigate the role of CRAs in the
credit crisis. 12 German Finance Minister Peter Steinbriick has highlighted
the conflict of interest created by CRAs' role in helping to structure RMBS
and CDO securities and expressed concern about the bank conduits, which
are outside supervisory authorities' purview.1 3  European Central Bank
President Jean-Claude Trichet has also advocated CRA regulation. 
1 4
Mr. McCreevy, who as Internal Market Commissioner may propose
European Union-wide financial regulations," 15 has stated his investigation
will concentrate on the same issues raised by critics of the United States:
conflicts of interest, downgrade tardiness, and rating methodology.
116
Additionally, he has requested that the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors evaluate the place of ratings in upcoming European banking
regulations. 1 7  McCreevey, recognizing that many characteristics of the
market and of structured finance products contributed to the crisis, has
criticized bank conduits and investors for mispricing risk and ignoring
repeated warnings as years of low interest rates softened inhibitions and
promoted herding behavior." 8  McCreevy's approach has been to seek
consensus with U.S. regulators on how to approach the CRA problems. 19
Along those lines, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) is studying implications of the crisis for regulators
and CRAs. IOSCO will focus on rating methodology and revaluate its 2003
11o CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 1 (statement of Lawrence White, Professor, New
York University Stem School of Business).
111 Adam Cohen, Trichet: Wants Further Study of Ratings Agencies, Dow JONES
NEWSWIRES, Oct. 2, 2007, available at 10/2/07 ODJSELECT 09:29:04 (Westlaw).
112 McCreevy Puts Pressure on Rating Agencies, IRISH INDEP., Sept. 13, 2007, available
at http://www.independent.ie/business/european/mccreevy-puts-pressure-on-rating-agencies-
1078683.html [hereinafter McCreevy Pressure].
113 Cohen, supra note 111.
114 Id.
115 McCreevy Pressure, supra note 112.
116 See Charlie McCreevy, Current Issues in the EU Banking Sector (Sept. 27, 2007)
(transcript available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission-barroso/mccreevy
/allspeeches-en.htm).
117 McCreevy Pressure, supra note 112.
I8 McCreevy Warns of 'Recessionary Effect' of Credit Crisis, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 15,
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 18044538.
119 Cohen, supra note I11.
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Credit Rating Agency Code of Conduct. 120  During the crisis, the
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) extended a pre-
existing review of CRA conduct, evaluation models, and conflicts of
interest. 121  CESR Secretary General Fabrice Demarigny made the
significant point that no current EU laws directly govern CRAs. 122 The
2003 IOSCO Code of Conduct has been voluntarily adopted by the major
CRAs but is not part of any Member State's national law. 3
Parliamentary treasury committee hearings in the United Kingdom
made a splash as Members of Parliament, reacting angrily to the Northern
Rock troubles, made disparaging remarks about CRA representatives and
showed ignorance about the role of ratings. 124  Meanwhile, the United
Kingdom's own securities regulator, the Financial Services Authority
(FSA), said through a spokesperson that some of the criticism is unfounded
and that AAA securities, including those backed by subprime mortgages,
have not defaulted in significant numbers. 125 Interestingly, the former U.S.
Federal Reserve Chief, Alan Greenspan, might be inclined to agree with the
surly Members of Parliament. Mr. Greenspan gave an interview to the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in which he opined that the CRAs "don't
know what they're doing."126
C. CRAs' Answers
The CRAs have answered many of the criticisms and have attempted
120 Michiyo Nakamoto, Regulators to Probe Rating Agencies, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007,
available at http://www.ft.com (search "nakamoto regulators probe" and follow third result
hyperlink).
121 Lorraine Mallinder, Rating Agencies Under EU Spotlight, EUR. VOICE, Sept. 6, 2007,
http://www.europeanvoice.com/archive/article.asp?id=28772.
122 Id.
123 Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies (EC) 2006/C 59/02
of Mar. 11, 2006 [hereinafter Commc'n from the Comm'n], at 5-6.
124 Jennifer Hughes, MPs Gain No Credit with Abuse of Ratings Agencies as a 'Shower',
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com (search "hughes mps shower" and
follow second result hyperlink).
125 Elaine Moore, Rating the Credibility of Credit Agencies, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007,
available at http://www.ft.com (search "moore rating credit agencies" and follow first result
hyperlink).
126 "Die Ursache des Problems war, dass die Leute glaubten, die Ratingagenturen
verstunden etwas vom ihrem Geschaft. Die wissen aber night, was sie tun [The chief
problem was, people thought the ratings agencies understood something about their business.
Turns out, they don't know what they're doing]." Norbert Kuls & Claus Tigges, Alan
Greenspan: ,,Die Ratingagenturen wissen nich was sie tun", FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Sept. 22, 2007, http://www.faz.net (search "greenspan wissen nicht" and follow
second result hyperlink). Mr. Greenspan also stated that, when it comes to accurately
pricing structured securities, "[j]etzt weiB jeder, dass das wahrscheinlich gar night moglich
ist [now everyone knows that's probably impossible]." Id.
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to adapt their evaluation models121 to account for "ahistorical behavioral
modes" that are newly prevalent among mortgage consumers. 128 Echoing
the FSA's statement that defaults have not been widespread, Standard &
Poor's presented its data on U.S. RMBS default rates to the September 26,
2007 Senate Hearing. 129 The data held that, through September 15, 2007,
default rates were approximately 7%, spread across the rating levels
(including a 0.04% default rate for AAA securities). 130 Standard & Poor's
asserted that, to the extent early payment defaults rose precipitously, ratings
could not have reflected such a risk because of the aforementioned
ahistorical behavioral modes.13 1  Ms. Tillman asserted that, in essence,
CRAs could not be blamed for borrowers' irrational behavior. 32 Tillman
pointed to quickly-escalating and wholly unexpected numbers of borrowers
who choose to pay off credit card debt before home loan debt and who have
debunked lending truisms such as the idea that borrowers who reside in the
mortgaged property repay more consistently than those who reside
elsewhere,' 3 and that borrowers with high credit scores repay more
consistently than borrowers with low credit scores. 1
34
Testimony from Moody's Investors Service focused on the agency's
disclaimers and warnings to investors and Moody's reliance on the
accuracy of information provided by issuers. 135 Mr. Kanef stated that the
company has "discouraged market participants from using our ratings as
indicators of price, as measures of liquidity, or as recommendations to buy
or sell securities" because ratings are designed to address only credit risk. 6
Ratings' quality is nullified by any errors or misrepresentation in data
furnished by issuers, and Kanef suggests that the need for increased
diligence on his company's part is unnecessary because "accuracy of
information disclosed by originators and underwriters in connection with
each transaction is subject to federal securities laws and regulations
127 Saskia Scholtes, Moody's Alters its Subprime Rating Model, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2007, http://www.ft.com (search "saskia moody's alters" and follow first result hyperlink).
128 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 5-6 (statement of Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice
President, Standard & Poor's).
129 Id. at 6.
130 id.
31 Id. at 5-6.
132 Id.
133 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 5-6 (statement of Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice
President, Standard & Poor's).
134 Id. at 12.
135 See CRA Hearing, supra note 30 (statement of Michael Kanef, Asset Finance Group
Managing Director, Moody's Financial Services).
136 Id. at 3. Compare id. (stating that ratings address only credit risk) with Rhodes, supra
note 43, at 304-06 (describing structured products ratings innovations made by Fitch and
S&P in response to such non-credit risks as interest rate, market, and cash flow risk).
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requiring accurate disclosure."' 137  Despite this reliance on issuer
information, Moody's has published reports on lax origination standards
and inflated housing prices since 2003.'38 The company felt it could issue
investment grade ratings in spite of those problems because it increased the
levels of credit enhancements required for such ratings. 139 The ratings firm
fell victim to its own foresight, as the spike in defaults in early 2007 seemed
to Moody's to be adequately buffered by credit enhancements, and the
company made no downgrades until collateral deterioration overran
estimates in May. 140 Respecting the explanations set out by Tillman and
Kanef, SEC Chairman Cox deferred judgment pending investigation. 14'
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? LOOKING AT CRA HISTORY, PAST
REGULATORY ACTION, AND INVESTOR PSYCHOLOGY
A. CRA Development and Liability
1. Development
Capital markets existed three hundred years before ratings. 42 During
that time, most debt was sovereign. 143 Outside capital markets, however,
trade credit ratings (reflecting trade debtors' creditworthiness) developed
and thrived in the nineteenth century U.S. mercantile trade. 144 As the U.S.
railroad bond market grew, the size and fragmentation of the United States
created informational asymmetries that could be solved by an adapted
version of the mercantile credit ratings. 145 The railroad ratings evolved to
be encapsulated in single rating symbols, which John Moody began selling
in 1909.146 The bond rating industry grew from that point forward with low
137 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 8 (statement of Michael Kanef, Asset Backed Finance
Group Managing Director, Moody's Financial Services).
138 Id. at 17.
139 Id. ("Our loss expectations and enhancement levels rose by about thirty percent over
the 2003 to 2006 time period.").
140 Id.
'4' Id. at 2 (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission).
142 Richard Sylla, An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating, in RATINGS,
RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 19, 20 (Richard M. Levich et al.
eds., 2002).
143 Id. at21.
144 Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for
the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 636-37 (1999) [hereinafter Siskel and
Ebert].
145 See id.; Sylla, supra note 142, at 22.
146 Siskel and Ebert, supra note 144, at 637-38.
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entry and exit barriers. 147 These low barriers promoted rating accuracy, as
did the ease (relative to today) of independent analysis and verification by
other market participants. 148 During the following decades, large financial
institutions used ratings "merely as a check on their own findings," while
smaller institutions relied heavily on ratings of credit risk in their
purchasing decisions. 149 Following a business lull during the economically-
stable 1940s and 1950s, 150 CRAs "exploded in size" from the mid-1970s
on.' 15  Significantly, it was in the mid-1970s that CRAs switched from
investor-subscription to issuer fee payment models, in large part because of
free-rider problems created by the advent of low-cost photocopying. 152 The
increasing complexity of financial instruments from that point forward
created further informational asymmetries that both investors and issuers
depended on CRAs to remedy. 153 For the complex instrument issuances to
grow in number and profitability, issuers needed the CRAs to promote
investor confidence. Issuance, investment, and the rating business fattened
in this environment. 
154
2. Past Failures and Liability
Crises involving putative ratings errors are an old hat. 155 The alarming
news is that their frequency has accelerated in the era of global finance.
Significant recent crises include the Orange County bonds crisis, 57 the
Asian flu, 158 and the Enron scandal. 159 These and other crises have tested
the liability of CRAs.
Those agencies with a special SEC-granted recognition status 160 are
147 Id. at 639-40.
148 Id.
141 Id. at 644.
150 Id. at 646.
151 Siskel & Ebert, supra note 144, at 648.
152 Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis,
in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 41, 47 (Richard M.
Levich et al. eds., 2002).
153 See Reiss, supra note 1, at 1007.
154 Id.
155 TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING
AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS 157 (2005) (defining "rating crisis" as
"the public perception of acute rating agency failure."). "The first major rating crisis of
modem times was the Penn Central Railroad bankruptcy of June 1970. The failure of
Franklin National Bank... sparked another significant rating crisis in 1974." Id.
156 Id.
117 Id. at 158.
118 Id. at 162.
9 Id. at 169.
160 See infra Part V.B.
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exempt from expert liability under Securities Act Section Eleven,'1 61 and the
line of U.S. cases testing CRA civil liability has, to date, favored CRAs.
162
CRAs have achieved dismissal or greatly reduced settlement payments in
crisis-related legal actions by arguing that ratings are protected speech and
are disclaimed. 63
Civil liability of CRAs to issuers or investors in Germany is governed
by the presence or absence of contractual relationships. 164 Liability in the
United Kingdom factors in contractual relationships, but the central
question is one of the duty of care. 165
B. Prior Official Action
1. In the United States
A central feature of the relationship between regulators and CRAs, and
of the ratings industry itself, has been the use of agency ratings for
regulatory purposes. Federal and state regulators in the United States have
used ratings in this manner since the 1930s. 166  The very fact of this
regulatory use means that the market is not the sole judge of ratings'
worth.167 When the SEC opted in 1975 to use ratings in its regulations, it
specified certain CRAs whose ratings would suffice and designated those
firms "Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations"
(NRSRO). 168  The SEC thereafter "recognized" any additional NRSROs
through no-action letters. 169  Even though the SEC is the only body
conferring NRSRO status, that designation has been used in a wide variety
of regulations and legislation concerning financial safety and soundness.'
161 Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 78 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002).
162 Id. at 79; Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The International Rating
Game: An Analysis of the Liability of Rating Agencies in Europe, England, and the United
States, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 783, 832-33 (1993).
163 Partnoy, supra note 161, at 79.
164 See Ebenroth & Dillon, supra note 162, at 788.
165 Id. at 832.
166 Sylla, supra note 142, at 36.
167 See White, supra note 152, at 44.
168 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 3 (statement of Lawrence White, Professor, New
York University Stem School of Business).
169 Id.
170 See SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS at 7 n.16 (Jan. 2003)
[hereinafter SEC 2003 Report] (listing eleven legislative and regulatory uses of the NRSRO
designation). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 directed the SEC to produce this report in
light of concerns over CRAs' performance in the Enron scandal. SINCLAIR, supra note 155,
at 171.
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The nature of the CRA product has thereby fundamentally changed:
"[i]ssuers pay rating fees, not to facilitate access to the capital market, but
to purchase a privileged status for their securities from the regulator. As a
result, licensed rating agencies will have a product to sell regardless of the
,0171analytic quality of their ratings ....
There are complaints about the efficacy of the NRSRO recognition
process. Between the advent of the NRSRO designation (then granted to
three firms) and 1992, only four new entrants were so designated.
172
Mergers returned the total number of NRSROs to three by 2000, and there
were no further recognitions until 2003.173 This, combined with the issuer
regulatory access incentive, has protected the market share of those three
initial NRSROs. The bar to market entry is extremely high, because while
the SEC's recognition decisions do consider a CRA's operational capacity
and reliability, the central factor is national recognition in the United
States. 7 4 Of course, national recognition is nearly impossible to achieve
without NRSRO status. Despite these concerns, the SEC declined to
implement alternatives it considered in 1993.171
The regulatory scheme is not necessarily fatal to ratings' market
usefulness. A regulatory license incentive for issuers does not explain the
fact that usual practice for issuers is to purchase two ratings, nor that the
market values doubly-rated securities more than singly-rated ones. 176
Indeed, two ratings are usually purchased from the most expensive CRAs
(Moody's and Standard & Poor's). 177  The market reacts better to such
issuances (and even to issuances rated only by one of those two CRAs) than
to issuances rated by Fitch. 178 Issuers pay for these expensive ratings even
when the issuances are not expected to achieve the ratings levels pondered
in the relevant regulatory scheme. 1
79
Following and upon the basis of the SEC's 2003 report, the U.S.
Congress enacted the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.180
171 Richard Cantor, Moody's Investors Service Response to the Consultative Paper Issued
by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision "A New Capital Adequacy Framework, " 25 J.
BANKING& FIN. 171, 179 (2001).
172 CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 3 (statement of Lawrence White, Professor, New
York University Stem School of Business).
173 Id.
174 See SEC 2003 Report, supra note 170, at 9.
' Id. at 10 (The SEC had considered eliminating the NRSRO designation from SEC
rules or retaining the designation and asserting greater, more direct oversight of CRAs).
176 See St~phane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The
Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, 51 MCGILL L.J. 617, 634 (2006).
177 See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 43, 66 (2004).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-291, § 1, Sept. 29, 2006, 120
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Pursuant to this Act, which amended Section Fifteen of the Exchange Act,
the SEC proposed and adopted Rules 17g-1 through 17g-6.181 These Rules
require periodic status reapplication by current NRSROs, prescribe record-
keeping requirements to assist the SEC in future investigations into whether
CRAs follow requirements of the Act and internal guidelines, require CRAs
to submit audited financial statements to show that they have sufficient
resources and to list their largest customers so that the SEC can evaluate
possible conflicts of interest, and guard against partiality by prohibiting
misuse of non-public information and other abusive practices and by
requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest.'
82
2. In the European Union
The European Commission first reviewed the role of CRAs in the
wake of the Enron scandal. 183 In 2004, the European Commission and
European Parliament were again stirred to analyze issues related to CRAs,
this time by the Parmalat scandal, resulting in several EU legislative
measures with "major implications" for CRAs.
These measures, part of the Commission's Financial Services Action
Plan (FSAP), included a Market Abuse Directive, addressing conflicts of
interest and other forms of market abuse; 18 5 a Capital Requirements
Directive, specifying banks' capital requirements "based on the new
international capital requirements framework agreed [upon] by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision;" 186 and a Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive, which also addressed conflicts of interest by
prohibiting CRAs from providing bundled investment services without
authorization. 187  The Commission declined to address the European
Parliament's concern over rating industry competition because "excessive
market fragmentation could have adverse consequences" as "agencies may
face undue pressure to issue favorable ratings in order to attract clients."
1 8
Prior to the 2007 crisis, the Commission had determined that no more
legislation was needed. 1
89
Stat. 1327.
181 See Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations, SEC Rel. No. 34-55231 (proposed Feb. 2, 2007) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b).
11
2 Id. at 11-13.
183 Commc'n from the Comm'n, supra note 123, at 2.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 3.
186 Id. at 4.
187 Id. at 5. The FSAP is in the process of Member State adoption.
188 Commc'n from the Comm'n, supra note 123, at 5.
189 Id. at 6.
266
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C. Corrective Action
Proffered solutions are multifarious. Possible CRA-related changes
could enhance the usefulness of NRSRO/ECAI designations while reducing
conflicts of interest and the use of ratings in safety and soundness
regulation. Others advocate market correction alone.
A logical solution to the conflict of interest created by the issuer-
funded model of credit ratings might be a return to the pre- 1970's investor-
subscription model. However, ratings' accuracy and value increase with
exposure, 190 so new attempts to limit their dissemination would fail
practically 191 and in principle. If not funded by issuers or investors, ratings
could be government-funded. Drawbacks to this option include inhibited
innovation and the likely evolution of ratings into public guarantees against
losses.' 92 Mr. McCreevy has suggested strengthened internal controls and
firewalls for CRAs akin to those prevalent in the auditing industry.193 Such
a governance structure would see rating assessors reporting directly to
independent corporate directors so as to reduce business development
pressure from management. 194
The problem of NRSRO/ECAI designations is a particularly knotty
one. Because these designations allowed highly-rated (yet ultimately
problematic) RMBS and CDO debt to harm institutions protected by safety
and soundness regulations incorporating such designations, a logical
reaction might be to eliminate them. This would remove a powerful barrier
to entry. As the European Commission recognized, however, CRA
competition may inflate ratings.195 Abandoning the designations could also
promote issuers' use of sham ratings firms set up to rubber-stamp
issuances. 196  Recent changes to the designation process in the United
States 97 and in Europe 198 may be beneficial.
190 See Subprime Ratings for Rating Agencies, FT.coM, Aug. 16, 2007 (search "subprime
rating agencies" and follow first result hyperlink).
191 Issuer-funded ratings were made impracticable by free-rider problems in the 1970's.
See supra Part V.A. 1.
192 Subprime Ratings for Rating Agencies, supra note 190.
193 Charlie McCreevy, Address at Wachovia Bank Int'l Official Opening, (Oct. 26, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.exchange-handbook.co.uk/index.cfm?section=news
&action=detail&id=70363).
194 Id.
195 Commc'n from the Comm'n, supra note 123, at 5.
196 White, supra note 152, at 53.
197 Professor White sees advantages and disadvantages to the 2006 Act's NRSRO
registration and disclosure directives. The "open and transparent" registration scheme is an
improvement, but exposure of CRA procedures and methods may "erode the NRSROs'
intellectual property" and discourage innovation. Lawrence J. White, A New Law for the
Bond Rating Industry, REGULATION, Spring 2007, at 48.
198 The Bank of International Settlements proposes that banks themselves regularly
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The designations are relevant because they are used in financial safety
and soundness regulations. Such use may itself be problematic:
[T]he major rating agencies have been against the use of credit
ratings in the regulatory process due to the potential impact of rating
changes on financial markets, incentives to engage in ratings-
shopping, the accuracy of ratings in reflecting the underlying risks,
and the pressure that might be brought to bear on the
agencies .... 199
Safety and soundness regulations built on CRA ratings may promote
financial system instability200 and cause institutions' capital adequacy to lag
behind changing market needs.20' One solution is to more closely align
safety and soundness regulations with market realities by basing capital
adequacy requirements on investments' credit spreads rather than credit
ratings . Credit spread measurement is largely standardized and is easily
updated over the life of an investment.20 3 This may reduce the impact of
multi-tiered asset repackaging whereby subordinated tranches from diverse
issuances are purchased and pooled together into new tranches to produce
fresh AAA-rated senior debt.
The crisis' origins in the non-prime mortgage market suggest
corrective action aimed at lending practices. After years of knowing about
problems in the non-prime mortgage industry,20 4 the U.S. Congress is only
now considering Truth In Lending Act amendments that would reform
consumer mortgage practices across the board while giving special attention
to non-prime ("high cost") mortgages by tightening limitations on interest
rate adjustments and foreclosures. Additional limitations on loan-to-
value ratios may be prudent.20 6 While these changes are overdue, reacting
only to the specific asset classes that backed the offending RMBS and CDO
issuances will do little to prevent issuer and investor risk misperception
justify their risk assessments to regulators, thereby reducing reliance on ECAI assessments.
White, supra note 152, at 53.
199 Roy C. Smith & Ingo Walter, Rating Agencies: Is there an Agency Issue?, in
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 290, 308 (Richard M.
Levich et al. eds., 2002).
200 Edward I. Altman & Anthony Saunders, The Role of Credit Ratings in Bank Capital,
in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 99 (Richard M. Levich
et al. eds., 2002).
201 Id. at 100.
202 Partnoy, supra note 161, at 80.
203 Id.
204 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Letter from the Dep't of Justice Regarding Predatory Lending,
supra note 14.
205 H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, Nov. 15, 2007).
206 Adelson & Jacob, supra note 65.
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from spawning new bubbles and crises in the future.
Those who recognize the intractability of risk misperception might
look askance at commentary that emphasizes market correction
mechanisms. That markets now shy away from complex financial products
207with elusive risk and value characteristics may be a beneficial correction,
but decade intervals have historically been sufficient to recalibrate risk
perception such that new crises build °.
D. Investor Psychology
The drive toward relaxed origination standards was revved in part by
investor psychology, since investors seek cutting-edge high-yield
investment vehicles. Common features of investor psychology include
availability heuristics and disaster myopia, which feed an investor's
propensity to "see what it wants" by applying old lessons to new
circumstances, regardless of any external risk signals, and then overreacting
to risk realizations. A poor credit rating traditionally has been one risk
signal commonly heeded, but the securitized structures were designed to
offer securities across the range of investment-grade ratings.
This article has already alluded to investor psychology in discussing
the growth and collapse of the subprime-backed securities market. A brief
discussion of the underlying ideas follows.
An individual unknowingly uses the availability heuristic when
assessing a present situation's risk by means of association with irrelevant
information sources. 209  Most risk is confronted without independent
knowledge, requiring actors to rely on others210 or on prior experience of
questionable applicability. A driver who witnesses an automobile accident
will, for a time, react by driving as though the probability of a second
accident has increased; as the memory of the accident diminishes, so shall
the perceived risk.2 11 On a grander scale, there is disaster myopia, which is
207 See CRA Hearing, supra note 30, at 11 (statement of Lawrence White, Professor, New
York University Stem School of Business) ("[T]he financial markets will find ways of fixing
problems so that they are less likely to occur in the future."); Eavis, supra note 75 ("The new
era of banking we're moving into will result in banks doing more business on balance
sheet .. "); Malcolm D. Knight, General Manager, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Address at
the Group of Thirty International Banking Session: The Evolving Structure of the World
Economic System (Oct. 22, 2007).
208 See SINCLAIR, supra note 155, at 157-70 (surveying credit crises over the past three
decades).
209 See Richard J. Herring, Credit Risk and Financial Instability, in RATINGS, RATING
AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 345, 355 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds.,
2002).
210 Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear 10 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper
No. 128, 2d Series, June 16, 2001).
211 Herring, supra note 209, at 355.
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"[t]he tendency for the subjective probability of a disaster to decline during
long periods in which no disaster has occurred., 212 An implication of
disaster myopia is that, in periods of benign financial conditions, lenders
can be counted on to reduce capital positions and relax lending criteria.213
Once adverse conditions return, "highly publicized events" cause excessive
fear of statistically small risks. 214 Crisis blooms once fears about short-term
debt liquidity spread to and devalue putatively similar instruments. 1 5
Regulation that can manage and react to fear is essential to financial market
health. This aim must be balanced against the idea that even irrational fear
serves an important purpose in regulatory schemes: widespread fear
promotes issue saliency, which is "the bane of special interest influence. 21 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Regarding CRAs, regulatory and legislative investigation and action
over the past decade has focused on improving integrity and accuracy of
ratings. Current efforts to reform the mortgage industry inspire hope that as
many consumers as is responsibly sustainable by the market can become
homeowners. Removing restrictions on institutional investors' abilities to
purchase RMBS would provide maximum efficiency to securitization,
which is the specialty consumer finance industry's primary method of
financing. However, public policy also requires protection for those whose
pensions and other savings are funneled into institutional investment
structures and, thereafter, into RMBS and CDOs.
National and, one hopes, international regulatory action can reverse the
current trend of state-level anti-predatory lending acts creating regulatory
burden options for lenders and allowing pockets of irresponsible lending to
flourish. However, barring certain institutional investors from purchasing
RMBS would interfere with the origination financing needed for maximum
home ownership. Instead, protecting both the homeowners and the
investors could be achieved through national regulation concerning lending,
aimed at rooting out the irresponsible practices that initiated devaluation of
RMBS and CDOs this year. This may be combined with a re-examination
of how NRSRO designations in the United States and cognate designations
internationally are used in safety and soundness regulations. Allowing
rating firms to flourish or wither on the strength of their own market
performance rather than on the momentum of their regulatory licenses may
improve their performance.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 358.
214 Sunstein, supra note 210, at 9.
215 See SINCLAIR, supra note 155, at 162.
216 Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of
Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 36-37 (2002).
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It is important to address both the underlying origination practices and
the RMBS/CDO rating practices, because tinkering with only one or the
other has proved inadequate. Those who would prevent the next credit
crisis must contend with the idea that there is always another bubble a
decade away. Curbing disaster myopia can lessen the swing between the
wider financial market's feast and its subsequent famine when a bubble
inflates and bursts. Financial institutions' memories must be lengthened so
that risk perception can take into account those crises that occurred before
current management was in place. Transaction analysis, particularly when
dealing with complex new structures, must account for herding behavior
and justification heuristics, and must be subject to evaluation independent
of profit centers. Widespread familiarity with investor psychology
heuristics can work hand-in-hand with changes in capital adequacy
requirements and in ratings practices to promote financial stability and
responsibility.
VII. 2008 UPDATE: FRAGMENTED REGULATORY RESPONSE
The seriousness and the visibility of the crisis' effects caused a
proliferation of input and proposals from regulators in the United States and
in Europe. What followed amounted to a scrum by regulators seeking to
assert and increase regulatory authority over all actors involved in the
crises, including CRAs. The situation has led CRA representatives to warn
against a lack of global regulatory consistency.217 If recent history is any
guide, the CRAs' complaints are valid, as the process of harmonization and
equivalence has been arduous and lengthy (and incomplete) in the securities
and accounting contexts.2 1 8 There is little reason to believe, especially in
light of the balkanized regulatory response so far, that new CRA regulatory
regimes across the globe will achieve harmonization or equivalence more
efficiently.
Neither is market correction alone a satisfactory tack. A popular index
of subprime-backed securities, the ABX index, was a market innovation
that exacerbated the crisis through the availability heuristic. 21 9 The ABX
index gave those with subprime securities exposure a risk signal that, when
inserted into the availability and herding heuristics, led investors and
217 Tony Barber, EU Turns Up Heat on Rating Agencies, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2008,
http://www.ft.com (search "EU turns up heat on rating agencies" and follow first result
hyperlink).
218 See Tzung-bor Wei, The Equivalence Approach to Securities Regulation, 27 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 225 (2007) (examining international regulatory competition, harmonization,
and equivalence in securities and accounting contexts).
219 See Seran Ng, Carrick Mollenkamp & Scott Patterson, A 'Subprime' Gauge, in Many
Ways?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2007, http:online.wsj.com/article/SBl 1974129672621875-
email.html.
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warehouse lenders to pull out unnecessarily. One wonders if the crisis
would have been milder if not for this faulty risk recalibration and others
like it.
Market correction alone is also faulty because it would not lead CRAs
to correct legitimate operational problems. News reports revealed instances
of bowing to customer pressure to make changes in ratings or in rating
personnel, 220  legitimizing fears that the issuer-funded model has
fundamentally and harmfully altered the rating industry. In an example of
local government actions with global implications, the New York Attorney
General has surmounted a collective action problem to address issues that
have stymied the SEC, Congress, and the European Commission. The
attorney general's settlement with CRAs requires all NRSROs to alter their
practices at the same time. This simultaneousness is vital because the
221changes are unlikely to sit well with CRAs' customers. It is important to
leave customers no choice; otherwise the most responsible CRA-the one
making necessary fundamental corrections to operations-would
immediately become the least successful.
Investor groups want an entirely new regulatory body to oversee the
CRAs.222 This is unsurprising since the inception of a new agency presents
a chance for regulatory capture. At present, the regulatory power is thinly
spread across several agencies, chief among them the SEC. Each of these
agencies is now trying to arrogate more power from the others. In this
climate, investors face great uncertainty and risk of loss. With a fledgling
agency in charge of the ratings industry, these investor groups stand a far
greater chance of controlling the agenda.
The prospect of any single interest group seizing the regulatory
agenda, however, is even smaller because of the situation in Europe, where
Mr. McCreevy has recommended a form of CRA registration akin to the
NRSRO designation in the United States. 223  Member State finance
ministers are eager to show they are doing something to make it up to their
220 See Aaron Lucchetti, At Request of Bond Issuers or Bankers, Credit-Rating Firms
Switch Analysts, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2008 at CI.
221 See Securitization Update: SEC Proposes Rule Changes Relating to Credit Ratings on
Asset-Backed Securities, Mayer Brown, June 25, 2008, available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=5003&nid=6 (The settlement terms
combat ratings shopping by requiring CRAs to charge for ratings services performed on
prospective issuances even if issuers then decide to use a different CRA for the ultimate
rating, and by requiring CRAs to disclose information about all securities submitted for
review, including ones that never end up being issued. The settlement terms also seek to
improve asset quality by having CRAs create and disclose mortgage reviewing criteria and
requiring CRAs to demand more thorough representations and warranties from issuers
regarding assets).
222 Aaron Lucchetti, Finance Group Questions Bond-Rating Proposals, WALL ST. J., July
7, 2008, at C3.
223 Barber, supra note 217.
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people-those taxpaying bodies politic who have effectively been made
unwilling hedge counterparties, with billions of euros in public bailouts
going to a handful of banks in the commercial paper trap.224
The CRAs are cooperating with the diverse regulators, complaining
only about the specter of an unnavigable morass of inconsistent laws and
regulations.225 The complaint is valid and the morass is almost inevitable.
The process of international regulatory harmonization and equivalence in
securities and accounting contexts has been lengthy and arduous, and has
still not rounded some of the rough edges left during the post-Enron rush to
do something.226  There is nothing to indicate the CESR, the Federal
Reserve Board, the EC, the FDIC, the SEC, and IOSCO will begin
demonstrating a (heretofore absent) regard for concerted action and investor
psychology.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Securities and Exchange Commission issued joint
recommendations aimed at helping large financial institutions manage the
sizable reputational risks associated with creating and offering more
rarefied structured finance products (dubbed Complex Structured Finance
Transactions, or CSFTs).227 The joint statement recommends that financial
institutions avoid some incentive problems by having formalized approval
processes for CSFTs that involve evaluation by upper-level personnel
outside CSFT profit centers.228 In a nod to some psychology and incentive
problems, the joint statement entreaties financial institutions to not place
great stock in the assessments offered by counterparties or counterparties'
counsel, or in the fact that competitors are offering similar products or that
other institutions are willing to participate in the CSFT under
consideration. 229 Defeating psychology and incentives requires an ethics-
focused culture vigorously enforced by internal audit with the full backing
of senior and board management. The interagency statement merely
provides guidance, but these or similar recommendations may end up
carrying the force of law.
Modeling errors, 230 analyst reassignments, and comer-cutting show
224 See, e.g., Die Birger uibernehmen das Risiko, 15 SPIEGEL 78, at 78 (2008) (German
bank bailouts have been substantial, including E7.2 billion to IKB, E3.8 billion to WestLB,
E2.8 billion to Sachsen LB, and E2.4 billion to BayemLB).
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that improvement to CRA methodology is warranted, but the recurring
criticism of investor reliance on ratings is suspect. The recent decades'
shift in focus from banking to securities requires a larger measure of
investor reliance on credit ratings. Regulations' use of NRSRO and ECAI
designations has increased that reliance. Recommendations like those in
the interagency statement hit the mark because no amount of regulation can
save the too-clever world of finance from itself. The self-analysis, internal
oversight, and personal responsibility contemplated in the interagency
statement are the best hope for overcoming the psychology and incentives
that would steer this global financial system toward the next crisis.
hyperlink); Alina van Duyn & Joanna Chung, S&P Discloses Errors in Rating Models, FIN.
TIMES, June 13, 2008, http://www.ft.com (search "S&P discloses errors in rating models and
follow first result hyperlink).
